Battle of Dogger Bank by Tobias R. Philbin

Author:Tobias R. Philbin [Philbin, Tobias R.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, Naval, World War I, Strategy
ISBN: 9780253011732
Google: bzTlAgAAQBAJ
Publisher: Indiana University Press
Published: 2014-03-10T22:24:44+00:00

The events of 24th January 1915, coming so soon after the muddles which had occurred during the Scarborough raid . . . inevitably raise the question whether the advantages of possessing excellent intelligence is best reaped by a centralized operational authority, such as the Admiralty adopted or whether the intelligence should be given to sea-going commanders and ordering of movements and dispositions left in their hands. Though the arguments in favor of both systems are evenly balanced it seems to me that confusion is less likely if the delegated system is followed.157

There was lots of confusion at Dogger Bank. On the other side, the Germans did not have as much national or technical intelligence talent as the British. The Admiralstab did have a responsible section for its own codes and ciphers, the Chiffrierbureau [codes and cyphers]. It was under the Zentralabteilung [central department] of the Admiralty Staff. From 1911, the organization was under the Central Department of the Admiralty Staff.158 There was another department, under Commander William Michaelis, called the Department for Tactics and Admiralty [S] [sicherheit – security] which included wireless and communication developments–mostly the blue side service intercepts per-se Michaelis’ service in the Admiralty Staff was from September 1910 to September 1913. This officer went on to command the dreadnought battleship Thüringen from October 1913 until February 1915, when he took over from the disgraced Rear Admiral R. Eckerman as fleet chief of staff for Admiral Von Pohl. The significance of this is that attention was paid to the key elements of wireless and communications developments for the High Seas Fleet during its buildup. It meant that HSF wireless officers were aware of and good at reading the other side’s communications and analyzing communications patterns. Michaelis can be credited with a great deal more. In fact, if it were not for some shortsighted penurious Reichmarineamt functionaries, he might have given Germany the predecessor to the Enigma.159

There were three other Admiralty Staff departments, two with geographic responsibility – one for Europe (no mention of England) and one for the rest of the world; lastly, there was a Nachrichten-Abteilung (intelligence division) under Kapitän zur See Arthur Tapken. Alas, the records indicate more of a collection of attaché reports and newspapers from abroad, rather than a thorough all source analysis or even a collection effort. There was a thorough reorganization in April 1915, too late to help with Blücher, but which consolidated under the Nachrichten-Abteilung almost all intelligence functions. In addition, there was an entire Abteilung department dedicated to Chiffrierdienst (code and cipher service).160 The effectiveness of this has not yet been evaluated, but would appear to have made some difference in the ability of the Germans to carry out operations, particularly U-boat operations, and battle fleet operations as well.

Another aspect of what was known and when and how such knowledge might affect battles at sea includes the definitive history of the activities of British spies and agents of influence in Berlin in World War I which remains to be written; as does its opposite number of German spies and agents of influence in the First World War.

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