The Islamic State in Africa by Jason Warner;Ryan Cummings;Hni Nsaibia;Ryan O'Farrell;

Author:Jason Warner;Ryan Cummings;Hni Nsaibia;Ryan O'Farrell;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA
Published: 2021-11-13T00:00:00+00:00

The Near Enemy

*

Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

2002–2014

DRC’s 2002 peace treaty with Uganda, which saw the withdrawal of Ugandan troops and the cessation of support to the ADF-NALU from Sudan and Kinshasa, forced major changes in the group’s ideology and operations. No longer useful to regional sponsors in their battle with Uganda and severely weakened by Ugandan military pressure, the group struggled to maintain its relevance, all the while being seen still as a threat by Kampala. As the ADF-NALU became more and more integrated into Beni’s local political dynamics—forming alliances with partially demobilized Congolese militias that had operated in the area prior to the Ugandan withdrawal—it entered successive periods of military offensives, demobilization and rebuilding, beginning in 2005, turning its focus away from Uganda and instead towards the local political and military dynamics in Beni territory and the local communities with which they were neighbors.

While the first of several military offensives against the ADF-NALU had been launched in December 2005,31 and a failed cross-border raid by the ADF-NALU in March 2006 led to significant losses,32 it was a Ugandan amnesty offered in 2007 that most empowered Mukulu as the ADF-NALU’s leader. Attempts at peace talks brokered by the United Nations between the ADF-NALU and Uganda failed, but as many as 200 combatants and much of what remained of NALU surrendered and returned to Uganda.33 With NALU effectively gone—and their demands for the recognition of the Rwenzururu kingdom being met a year later in March 2008—the ADF-NALU effectively became merely the ADF, with Mukulu as leader.34

Having lost one of its Ugandan components, the ADF shifted toward being an amalgamation of Mukulu’s Ugandan Islamists and often press-ganged Congolese recruits and allies; already by 2007, as many as 60 percent of its fighters were Congolese, though the leadership remained primarily Ugandan.35 Despite Mukulu’s origins in Uganda’s Salafist movement, his time as leader of the ADF in the context of repeated military offensives, demobilizations and large-scale recruitment of locals produced a period of ideological flux within the group: his previous dreams of overthrowing Museveni shifted toward more immediate goals of survival.

While the stated goal of the group was to overthrow Museveni and install an Islamist government in Uganda,36 its public statements rarely referred to Islam.37 Instead, Islamism was used as a means of maintaining discipline within the ADF’s camps,38 as many of its troops were abductees from local Congolese communities rather than radicals. In addition, Mukulu likely utilized Islamism to secure support and assistance where he could: his son’s bail was paid by Kenyan Islamists following his 2011 arrest in Nairobi,39 and Arabic-speaking military trainers reportedly gave instruction to ADF personnel in 2013.40 It was clear, however, that whatever international ties Mukulu may have fostered, his focus remained centered on the survival of the ADF in Beni’s remote forests, with little clear evidence of aspiration to membership in the global jihadist movement.

As part of his attempts to make the ADF more resilient, Mukulu built extensive recruitment and financial networks outside eastern Congo, bolstering the

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.