The Concept of Justice and Equality by Eliane Saadé

Author:Eliane Saadé
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter
Published: 2015-02-15T00:00:00+00:00

5.6 Rescue of Equality from the Contradiction of the Difference Principle

Let one assume that the talented persons are truly unable - due to an insurmountable inability - to increase their production without receiving unequalizing incentives, “then there would be no consequent stain of injustice on the resultant society” (RJE: 153). But, even if inequalities were needed72 to augment productivity, they would remain unjust, because they result in one way or the other from morally arbitrary contingencies. Therefore, “the impossibility of justice, whether or not it is due to a flaw in human nature, is insufficient for the justice of the possible” (RJE: 155).

On the one hand, Cohen argues that the moral arbitrariness of social and economic inequalities and thereby their injustice contradicts the content of the difference principle, which endorses the justice of these inequalities. He explains furthermore that there are two versions of the difference principle which express different rationales. Whereas on the canonical view, “there is nothing especially privileged about equality” (RJE: 157), acting within the non-canonical difference principle implies “not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off” (ibid.). On the other hand, the inequality that the canonical difference principle tolerates does not compensate for undeserved and thereby unjust morally arbitrary contingencies. This inequality increases the social and economic differences among the social classes.

The unfairness of arbitrarily caused inequality is the starting point of a chain of reasoning that ends in affirmation of the [canonical] difference principle, but that principle shows no trace of commitment to fairness that justifies that starting point (RJE: 158).

Thus differences in talent do not justify social and economic inequalities and that is why, Cohen argues, Rawls starts with equality and then justifies inequality (within the Pareto argument), which is based on morally arbitrary causes. Therefore, “fairness fanatics will then eliminate the inequality, and sensible folk, like me, will tolerate it, while judging it to be unfair” (RJE: 168). Cohen highlights another contradiction between the Pareto argument and the moral arbitrariness that the difference principle embodies.

The reason we begin with equality is the moral arbitrariness of the standard causes of inequality. We are then told that, if everyone can be made better off, there is no reason to stay with equality. But there is a (nonconclusive) reason to stay with it, to wit, the reason we had to begin with it (ibid.).

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.