Russia's Last Gasp by Prit Buttar

Author:Prit Buttar [Buttar, Prit]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, World War I, Russia & the Former Soviet Union, Europe
ISBN: 9781472812780
Google: 4v-FDAAAQBAJ
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Published: 2016-09-22T05:00:00+00:00

Ragosa blamed

Stavka

for lack of a properly-thought-out plan, and for lack of character to stick to a plan, whether good or bad. He says they are too easily impressed and constantly attracted to new ventures.

293

Whilst there may be some truth in Ragosa’s criticism of Russian officers, this account too is misleading. The catastrophic performance of many senior Russian officers left Stavka with no choice but to replace commanders, and the pool of available talent was so poor that it was inevitable that on some occasions, individuals who had previously been dismissed were given new posts elsewhere. The exigencies of war made it impossible for armies to consist of the same corps for long periods. All of these limitations applied to Brusilov too, yet he managed to achieve a degree of success that far surpassed any of his Russian contemporaries.

Another consequence of Evert’s last-minute change of emphasis from his original planned attack to the new one at Baranovichi was that it removed all possibility of coordinating his attack with that of Northern Front; both attacks were now reduced to the level of merely tying down German forces. Kuropatkin’s forces launched attacks in mid-July, but the Germans had long anticipated them and had prepared accordingly. With substantial forces – and, equally importantly, artillery supplies – already transferred to Southwest Front, the attacks could not be sustained for long. After a few days of futile bloodshed, the assaults faded away. The front line had not moved at all. There were some fanciful proposals – again – to mount an amphibious operation in the Gulf of Riga to outflank the German lines from the north, but Kuropatkin argued that any such operation could not be coordinated with the axis of his planned attack, and any amphibious operation should be planned as a self-contained attack. Rather than squander troops on such a speculative venture, Alexeyev dropped the entire proposal.294

On 2 July, Gruppe Marwitz renewed its assaults and made encouraging progress. In an attempt to halt the German and Austro-Hungarian forces, Sakharov threw whatever reserves he had available into the fight, and the Russians launched a series of counterattacks with infantry and dismounted cavalry. Sakharov also warned Brusilov and Kaledin that he might be forced to pull back his northern flank. This would have destabilised the defences of the southern part of the Lutsk salient, and Brusilov ordered Kaledin to release one infantry and one cavalry division to Sakharov. Casualties continued to mount throughout 2 July, and whilst the Russian counterattacks prevented further advances by Marwitz, the price was severe, and little or no ground was recovered. Further north, Tersztyánsky’s Fourth Army succeeded in widening its front, allowing Gruppe Falkenhayn to release an additional infantry division for use by Marwitz. At first, Tersztyánsky continued to urge Csanády to renew his attacks with X Corps; as both Csanády and 11th Infantry Division’s commander Obauer had predicted, the exhausted division was forced back to the positions it had occupied on 1 July. Linsingen now intervened, ordering Fourth Army to

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