Refighting The Last War by D. Clayton James

Author:D. Clayton James
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: SOC035000
Publisher: The Free Press
Published: 1993-07-15T00:00:00+00:00

DECIDING TO GO TO WAR

If the literal interpretation of the Constitution had been followed and a congressional declaration of war had been obtained, the time-consuming process undoubtedly would have enabled the North Korean conquest of the southern part of the peninsula to be consummated. During the first days of the North Korean invasion, ROK resistance proved spotty and mostly feeble; it quickly became obvious that only strong and quick external intervention could save South Korea. Thus Truman boldly called together a circle of fourteen civilian and military advisers in a series of meetings over the fateful six-day period of June 25-30, 1950, culminating in the full commitment of American armed forces to the Korean conflict.

North Korea badly miscalculated, acting on the presumption that the United States would not intervene, and that if it did choose to assist South Korea, its governmental machinery was so cumbersome that it would require lengthy congressional debates before voting to go to war. North Korea was not the first or last belligerent to discover that many hostilities in which the United States has engaged began with quick executive actions rather than with declarations of war by Congress. Truman’s sudden reversal of strategy on Korea and his brazen bypass of the war-making power of the legislative branch would result in the hurling of American firepower into the fray just in time to prevent the overrun of all South Korea. However, it also precluded strong bipartisan support of the administration’s war policies on Capitol Hill. The whirl of meetings and decisions those final days of June would cast a long shadow over the Truman administration, indeed, to its very end.

According to Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, a top expert on the Soviets who was close to Truman and many of the advisers the President turned to that last week of June, “When all is said about Korea, however, the fact remains that the two men responsible for finally blocking the expansion of Communism were the cocky little President of the United States, and his icy-eyed Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.” Regarding the thirteen other key advisers involved in the decision-making that week, Bohlen observes, “One thing is certain: they all relied heavily on Acheson, who had worked out an admirable relationship with the President. The Secretary of State came up with many of the ideas; the President, and the President alone, made the decisions.” 13 Truman was frank in acknowledging Acheson’s great diplomacy and his initiative in immediately calling into session the UN Security Council so that the United States would not go into Korea alone.

Acheson orchestrated the initial response of the U.S. government to the outbreak of Korean hostilities, and he continued to direct much of the process of decision-making during the period of June 25-30. Both of the Blair House conferences of Truman and his top assistants, on June 25 and 26, were characterized by Truman’s presiding and Acheson’s leading in introducing and pushing substantive proposals that the President eventually approved, the other advisers going along without serious objections or questions.

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