Planning a Tragedy by Larry Berman

Author:Larry Berman
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
Published: 2013-08-14T16:00:00+00:00

The Deliberative Process at Work?

In The Vantage Point Johnson wrote that he “wanted to go over [McNamara’s] proposal with the greatest care. I realized what a major undertaking it would be. The call-up of large numbers of reserves was part of the package. This would require a great deal of money and a huge sacrifice for the American people. I summoned my top advisors to the White House on July 21, the day after McNamara returned.”37 What followed is a remarkably documented discussion of alternatives to McNamara’s recommendations. To some, like Jack Valenti, “those who sat in on all the meetings over the week-long torment knew that Lyndon Johnson listened carefully to every new point.… It was as if he were determined to dredge up every piece of information that might have even the barest relevancy to the decision.”38 Yet to Chester Cooper “we were now in too deep to back out and it was a foregone conclusion, as the President had already warned, that major new deployments would be made. The only questions revolved around the size of the new forces to be committed and how they were to be raised and supported.”39 The first session* to discuss McNamara’s report was scheduled for July 21. Before the president arrived, McNamara reviewed his program recommendations with the group. After three quarters of an hour the president arrived and asked a series of questions (the questions really do appear as staged for purposes of consensus building; Johnson already had the answers and the policy):*40 “What I would like to know is what has happened in recent months that requires this kind of decision on my part. What are the alternatives? I want this discussed in full detail, from everyone around this table.” Johnson continued, “Have we wrung every single soldier out of every country that we can? Who else can help us here? Are we the sole defenders in the world? Have we done all we can in this direction? What are the compelling reasons for this call-up? What results can we expect? Again, I ask you what are the alternatives? I don’t want us to make snap judgments. I want us to consider all our options.” The discussion which followed was an extremely important one. According to George Ball, “This meeting was special only in that, once the decision under consideration was accepted, the United States would commit thousands of its young men not just to passive defense missions but to aggressive combat roles. The war would then become unequivocably our own. There would be no turning back for months, perhaps years—and that would not occur until we had suffered horrible casualties, killed thousands of Vietnamese and raised the level of national anxiety and frustration above the threshold of hysteria.”42 In reproducing the discussion in its entirety, I alert my readers to William Bundy’s recollection that “at the first meeting (July 21) the President went through this, ‘Is it right? What are the alternatives? George Ball, tell me what you

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