Peace Operations in the Francophone World: Global Governance Meets Post-Colonialism by Bruno Charbonneau & Tony Chafer

Peace Operations in the Francophone World: Global Governance Meets Post-Colonialism by Bruno Charbonneau & Tony Chafer

Author:Bruno Charbonneau & Tony Chafer [Charbonneau, Bruno & Chafer, Tony]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, Peace, Security (National & International), Political Freedom, History, Africa, General
ISBN: 9781317750123
Google: nBaLAwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 22214620
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-05-09T00:00:00+00:00


Assessing the French role

Before initiating an EU operation, France had intervened in both countries on behalf of the regimes in power through its permanent military presence in the two countries (operations Epervier in Chad and Boali in the CAR). In Chad, France supported President Idriss Déby against a rebel attack in April 2006, with weapons, logistical support, and secret service information, and French fighter jets fired ‘warning shots’ at the rebels. In the CAR, Paris intervened even more directly. In March 2007, it deployed 50 paratroopers to the northeastern city of Birao to allow central African troops to recapture it from rebels.36 This made sceptics speculate about the ‘real’ intentions France was pursuing through the EUFOR operation.37

The scepticism surfaced when France tried to gain EU support for the operation. Germany and the UK in particular feared being instrumentalised and signalled very early that they were reluctant to participate in a military adventure in a French sphere of influence.38 In the end, both states supported the operation politically but did not send any troops. Smaller EU members were also reluctant to become engaged, which is why it took over four months (October 2007 until January 2008) and five troop-contributing conferences to assemble the 3,700 soldiers for the operation. It was not until January 2008, when Austria agreed to participate and France promised to provide more troops than originally planned, that the operation was ready for deployment.39

Certainly, the initiative to launch EUFOR Chad/CAR was not only motivated by readiness to support Déby and Bozizé. It was mainly a small group around Kouchner and his then special adviser for crises and conflicts, Eric Chevallier, who convinced Sarkozy to make an impression at the beginning of his presidency by doing something about the Darfur conflict. Both men had backgrounds in the humanitarian field and were not known to be close to the presidents of Chad and the CAR.40 Still, remaining proponents of the idea of a pivotal French role in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa (mainly in the military and the Elysée palace) saw this as an opportunity to bolster two close French allies in the region. This is also why they opposed the idea of including Epervier troops in the EU operation, which was briefly discussed but abandoned in the end.41

It remains unclear whether Kouchner and Sarkozy really saw the ambiguity inherent in pursuing a dual policy. It is clear though that Chadians have been well aware of the ambiguities in French policy and have tried to make it work in their favour. This became especially apparent in two phases of the operation. First, when the mandate of the operation was drafted, Déby tried to use the ambiguity by initially refusing to consent to the operation. However, during his negotiations with the French government, he came to the conclusion that EUFOR Chad/CAR might serve as an additional bulwark against rebel attacks from Eastern Chad. He knew that France was neither eager to abandon EUFOR Chad/CAR, which Sarkozy and Kouchner saw as a foreign policy prestige



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