Linebacker: The Untold Story of the Air Raids over North Vietnam by Eschmann Karl J

Author:Eschmann, Karl J. [Eschmann, Karl J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Lume Books
Published: 2020-07-22T16:00:00+00:00

Chapter Five

PHASE TWO: A NEW BATTLE PLAN EVOLVES

The Basis for New Tactics

Several significant factors were noted by the Tacair crews during the Day Three wave attacks. The MIGCAP flights reported that enemy SAM reactions were lighter during Wave Three and no MIGs were airborne. The enemy was firing either single SAMs or pairs of SAMs against individual B-52s. The SAMs appeared to be very accurate. [324] This was further verified by the Iron Hand flights. The Weasel crews knew that something was aiding the SAM operators besides their Fan Song missile-guidance radars, because the Weasels were not intercepting indications of valid guided SAM launches. Yet numerous aircrews had observed airborne SAMs that appeared to be guiding on the B-52 forces. It was surmised by our Wild Weasel crews that a modified target-data acquisition systems was being used by the North Vietnamese as a countermeasure against the support forces. [325]

On Day Three, several crews intercepted a new North Vietnamese radar signal on their ECM receivers that operated in both E and I bands. The new signal was code-named T-8209.3 The T-8209 radar appeared to be a modified Fire Can gun-control radar, with a bandswitching capability from E band (2000-3000 MHz) to I band (9000-10,000 MHz).T-8209 radar had initially been picked up in 1972 by RC-135 intelligence-gathering aircraft, but its use had remained unknown. EB-66 crews has been looking for it since August. [326] The EB-66s orbiting west of Hanoi also verified the use of T-8209 at a number of NVN SAM sites, notably the infamous VN-549 site which had apparently been responsible for a number of accurate SAM engagements with the B-52s. The North Vietnamese crews had been careful to hide T-8209 until it was really needed. The checkout and testing of the system had probably taken place during November near the Vinh area, and may have been responsible for the downing of the first B-52 on 22 November, which was described in Chapter Two.

Basically, the T-8209 was used to provide range information for the SA-2 SAM tracking system. Combined with the track-on-jam azimuth information available from the Fan Song radar, the normal missile-guidance information could be obtained and the straight point-to-point missile path could be used. This allowed a shorter time of flight for the missile and lesser time for defensive SAM breaks by the targeted aircraft. [327] The use of T-8209 explained the almost complete lack of active Fan Song signals reported during periods of numerous SAM launches. During the first two nights, the enemy had salvo-fired large numbers of SAMs, hoping to gain lucky hits using the SAM’s proximity fusing. However, by the end of Day Three, it appeared that I band radar guidance allowed very accurate single and paired SAM launches. Since the technique used the passive, guided home-on-jam procedure and an odd frequency, none of the U.S. electronic countermeasures were designed to counter it. [328] The ECM experts at Korat began investigating possible methods to counter the new threat.

The effectiveness of the protective chaff corridors was a major concern during days One through Three.

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