Libya in Western Foreign Policies, 1911–2011 by Saskia Van Genugten

Author:Saskia Van Genugten
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK, London

France, less constrained than the UK by the alliance with the US, was also eager to keep trading with the new leadership in Libya. Despite the decolonization of North Africa, Paris never tired of trying to increase its influence in the Mediterranean. Consecutive French presidents showed few misgivings about bestowing Qaddafi’s Libya with a highly advanced air force and a great amount of assault weaponry. Just after the coup, a great opportunity arose in the eyes of the French. The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 had forced France to adhere to an arms embargo on the region. As a result, France canceled a sale of 50 Mirage V planes. In November 1969, the Qaddafi regime hinted that it was willing to buy from the embargoed deal.82 Sensing that its European allies would vehemently oppose such a transaction, France openly denied interest. But, soon after, Paris admitted to having made a deal with Libya for 15 of the embargoed aircrafts. Still some days later the number had risen to 50, and another couple of days later French minister of defense Michel Debré announced a deal of 110 Mirages, to be delivered by 1974.83 Libya lacked capable pilots, had no technicians and no maintenance staff and, as a result, France would receive generous payments for the training of around 200 pilots and an additional 3,000 ground staff.84 In the broader picture of regional politics, the sale of the Mirages was also seen as a way to increase French goodwill on the side of the “progressive” republics in the MENA region (versus the British inspired reactionary monarchies). The deal was profitable but risky and indeed angered France’s Western allies, Italy in particular. French pilots flew Mirage planes during a grandiose air show in celebration of the first anniversary of the revolutionary coup, just weeks after the brutal expulsion of the Italian community. The US and others were afraid that Libya would sell the planes to Egypt, or worse, use them against Israel.

Of all the Western allies, the United States took the most cautious, if not hostile approach towards Qaddafi’s Libya.85 The US was especially suspicious about Libya’s claims to a non-alignment policy. After all, the Libyans had invited Nasser to Libya on the day of the signing of the Wheelus Field Base withdrawal agreement.86 And soon thereafter, around a thousand Egyptian troops were stationed in Libya, while the RCC requested 300 Egyptian military advisers to train the secret services and police forces. Libyan cadets initially received military training in Egyptian academies instead of in its own training department. Moreover, Libya incessantly called upon states to break relations with Israel and had shown its willingness to use commercial contracts and energy flows as political weapons. In 1972, the US withdrew its ambassador from Tripoli and imposed export controls on military equipment and aircraft. Nevertheless, it could continue trading through companies in third countries. For example, in 1973, Italy sold to Libya several Augusta helicopters as well as 20 Chinook helicopters manufactured in Italy under US license as well as material of US design or origin.

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