Reality+ by David J. Chalmers

Author:David J. Chalmers
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
Published: 2021-12-15T00:00:00+00:00

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The arguments in this chapter can help us think clearly about the simulation hypothesis. We saw in chapter 2 that the hypothesis can be split into the pure simulation hypothesis, in which our cognitive system is part of the simulation, and the impure simulation hypothesis, in which it’s not. The traditional brain-in-a-vat scenario is an impure simulation, as is the situation in The Matrix. In this chapter we’ve mainly been focusing on impure simulations, in which the cognitive system and the physics of the virtual world are distinct.

If I accept the impure simulation hypothesis, I should accept the Cartesian dualist hypothesis that my cognitive system is nonphysical and interacting with physical systems. My mind is outside the physical space of my virtual world, and it interacts with my body, which is inside that space. My physical world derives entirely from bits in a computer, but my mind is tied to the brain in a vat, which need not derive from bits at all.

Earlier, I argued that the simulation hypothesis leads to the it-from-bit creation hypothesis. Now we can see that the impure simulation hypothesis leads to the Cartesian it-from-bit creation hypothesis: Physical systems derive from computational processes, put in place by a creator, and our cognitive systems are distinct from, and interact with, these physical systems. In effect, the impure simulation idea is akin to combining the it-from-bit creation idea about the physical world with Cartesian dualism about the mind. By contrast, the pure simulation hypothesis leads to the non-Cartesian it-from-bit creation hypothesis: Our cognitive systems derive from physical systems, which derive from computations, which are themselves created.

I’m not suggesting that the impure simulation hypothesis is especially plausible. If you take the simulation hypothesis seriously because of the statistical argument (see chapter 5) that simulations will be common, this reasoning tends to support the pure simulation hypothesis. It will be easier to create pure simulations (just set up the simulated physics of a world and watch it go), and much harder to create impure simulations (in which you’ll need separate minds to interact with the simulation). If you need a biological brain for every impure simulation, this poses a hurdle that may limit the supply of impure simulations. As long as pure simulations can also support minds like ours (as we’ll discuss in the next chapter), statistical reasoning suggests that it’s more probable that we’re in a pure simulation than an impure one.

Furthermore, insofar as we have reasonable evidence that physics forms a closed network in our world, this is evidence against the Cartesian hypothesis and against the impure simulation hypothesis, or at least against versions of these hypotheses in which the mind makes a difference in the physical world.

Still, simulation reasoning may give us reason to take Cartesian dualism more seriously than before. Cartesian dualism initially seems supernatural—inconsistent with a naturalistic view of the world. Simulation reasoning shows us how Cartesian dualism might be entirely naturalistic, deriving from natural processes in an outer world. Just as simulation reasoning gave us a naturalistic version of theism, it also gives us a naturalistic version of Cartesian dualism.

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