Theory and Reality, Second Edition: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science by Peter Godfrey-Smith

Author:Peter Godfrey-Smith [Godfrey-Smith, Peter]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: PHI000000 Philosophy / General, PHI004000 Philosophy / Epistemology, SCI075000 Science / Philosophy & Social Aspects
Publisher: The University of Chicago Press

9.2 Quine and Others

The birth of modern naturalism is often said to be the publication of W. V. Quine’s paper “Epistemology Naturalized” (1969). But modern naturalism did not come entirely out of Quine. The American philosopher John Dewey is usually thought of as a pragmatist, but during the later part of his career (from roughly 1925 onward) he presented his philosophy as a form of naturalism. In some areas, Dewey’s version of naturalism is superior to Quine’s. But Dewey’s philosophy was neglected during the second half of the twentieth century, and Quine is the figure who had the most influence on the movement.

In “Epistemology Naturalized,” Quine made a number of claims. He first attacked the idea that philosophers should give foundations for scientific knowledge. Quine’s claims on this point have become widely accepted by naturalists. But Quine also made a more radical claim. He suggested that epistemological questions—philosophical questions about evidence and justification—are so closely tied to questions in scientific psychology that epistemology should not survive as a distinct field at all. Instead, epistemology should be absorbed into psychology. The only questions asked by epistemologists that have real importance, in Quine’s view, are questions that can be answered by psychology itself. Psychology will eventually give us a purely scientific description of how beliefs are formed and how they change, and we should ask for no more.

This version of naturalism is one that I, and many others, oppose. Quine seems to be claiming that philosophers interested in questions about belief and knowledge should close up shop and go home. It’s not surprising that philosophers, especially those who want to remain employed, would object to Quine on this point, but it’s not only a matter of wanting to keep paying the rent; there is a deeper issue here.

In a different version of naturalism, there is such a thing as a philosophical question, distinct from the kinds of questions asked by scientists. A naturalist can think that science can contribute to the answers to philosophical questions, without thinking that science should replace philosophical questions with scientific ones. That is the version of naturalism that I defend. This contrasts with the kind of naturalism described by Quine in his 1969 paper; there we think of science as the only proper source of questions as well as the source of answers.

If we think that philosophical questions are important and also tend to differ from those asked by scientists, there is no reason to expect a replacement of epistemology by psychology and other sciences. Science is a resource for philosophy, not a replacement.

What might be examples of these questions that remain relevant in naturalistic philosophy but are not directly addressed within science itself? Many naturalists have argued that normative questions are important cases here—questions that involve a value judgment. If epistemology was absorbed by psychology, we might get a good description of how beliefs are actually formed, but apparently we would not be told which belief-forming mechanisms are good and which are bad. We would not

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