Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (Routledge Revivals) by Peter Mangold

Author:Peter Mangold [Mangold, Peter]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Regional Studies, Political Science, International Relations, Diplomacy
ISBN: 9781135046835
Google: Ld9SAQAAQBAJ
Barnesnoble:
Goodreads: 17119529
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2013-02-27T00:00:00+00:00

Notes

1.

Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 280.

2.

The United States had apparently however previously explored the possi-bility of an internally-mounted coup. Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, pp. 293–4.

3.

This is based largely on Eisenhower’s account contained in Waging Peace, pp.198–203.

4.

Ibid. For details of Anglo-American co-operation during the crisis see Macmillan, op.cit., pp.277–86.

5.

There were a variety of constraints. Military action would have risked the destruction of the Iraqi oil pipeline across Syria, as well as internal unrest in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. In addition there were rivalries between the potential proxy powers.

6.

E.J. Hughes, Ordeal of Power, pp.2534. Earlier in the wake of the Suez crisis the Turks had expressed their willingness to consider a preventive strike against Syria. Charles Bohlen, Witness to History, pp.435–6.

7.

Eisenhower, op.cit., p. 203.

8.

For Soviet reaction see J.M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp.226–8. Also George S. Harris, ‘The Soviet Union and Turkey’ in Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne Vucinich (ed.), The Soviet Union in the Middle East which suggests that both Menderes and Khrushchev had an interest in inflating the crisis for domestic reasons; pp.40–1.

9.

Seale, op.cit., p. 294.

10.

See chap. 10.

11.

According to the then American Ambassador, Britain and France had given secret assurances in 1956 of their readiness to preserve the integrity of the Lebanon. ‘The only new blank cheque which President Chamoun desired to draw was that of the United States.’ Robert McClintock, The Meaning of Limited War, p. 102. The American Ambassador reported that there was evidence of arms coming in from outside, and referred to radio attacks on Chamoun by Cairo and Damascus. The British were even more forthright. On the day the Lebanese request was received in London, Macmillan noted, ‘Nasser is organising an internal campaign there against President Chamoun and his regime. This is partly communist and partly Arab Nationalist. Russian arms are being introduced from Syria, and the object is to force Lebanon to join the “Egyptian-Syrian” combination. In other words, after Austria — the Sudetenland Germans. Poland (in this case Iraq) will be the next to go.’ Macmillan, op.cit., p. 506.

12.

Twice in June 1958 Chamoun asked for American intervention but was discouraged by the American Ambassador. Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat, p. 76; McClintock, op.cit., p. 116.

13.

McClintock, op.cit., p. 105.

14.

Thayer, op.cit., p. 79.

15.

The decision was reportedly made against the advice of the National Security Council. Apart from the uncertain political situation in the Lebanon, the State Department believed that intervention would result in the closure of the Suez Canal, the cutting of the IPC pipeline across Syria and serious disturbances in Kuwait. The military also had reservations. The air force reportedly argued that the Middle East was vulnerable to Soviet air power, and the navy was concerned about the length of its supply lines back to the United States. William Polk, The United States and the Arab World, p. 283; William Quandt, ‘United States policy in the Middle East’ in Hammond and Alexander (ed.) Political Dynamics in the Middle East; Eisenhower, op.cit., p. 271; Hughes, op.cit., p. 263.

16.

Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p.

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