Policing China by Suzanne E. Scoggins;

Author:Suzanne E. Scoggins;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Lightning Source Inc. (Tier 3)
Published: 2021-02-04T00:00:00+00:00

Centralized Control

Standing in stark contrast to patterns of decentralized and shared control is the highly centralized power that ministry officials exert over police response to national priority issues. Centralized control41 is difficult to achieve because everyone has to be on the same page. As such, centralization requires coordination between frontline police, local governments, provincial and central ministry officials, and Communist Party leaders at all levels. Because city and county governments hold command over financial resources and often appoint local police station leaders, it is not easy for the ministry to overcome local resistance, as the pattern of shared control demonstrates. Yet MPS officials have nevertheless proved able to unify control over weiwen, demonstrating the strength of the Chinese state in accomplishing goals it considers essential.42 The results for (certain types of) policing on the ground are palpable. According to frontline reports, crime management works much better under centralized control because front-line officers receive more attention from the ministry in the form of training and resources. Efforts between local forces are also better coordinated, and clear protocols are in place for what to do when various types of protest events or dissident action occur.

The PSB has many incentives to centralize control over local police response to stability maintenance. Regime-destabilizing events are a concern given the country’s history of protests, and the central leadership has charged the ministry with assisting the Communist Party in prioritizing stability maintenance and preventing the emergence and growth of social movements that might pose a threat to the party-state. Proper police management of these events is critical for the CCP and the MPS. Protests and riots must be handled swiftly and with some consideration for public perception. Long, drawn-out events such as the five-month standoff between protesters and police in Wukan village attract unwanted attention from both the press and social media users, in addition to being difficult to suppress.43 To prevent the spread of such events, the national priority of stability maintenance thus takes precedence over other policing problems, especially since the number of protests has not abated. But even though the priorities are clear and ministry officials know what they have to do, the decentralized nature of policing in China makes unifying control difficult.

In order for the ministry to centralize power over police operations, it must by definition bring local power holders in line. Such coordination works better when the priorities of local government leaders and the ministry lack conflict, but overcoming local resistance in the absence of naturally aligned interests is not impossible. In the case of weiwen management, the ministry receives a major boost from central government policies through the cadre evaluation system, and direct accountability for cadres has led local government leaders to divert more resources to controlling social unrest, since central government funds are insufficient to cover all needs in this area. This process is not perfect, however, and local governments have many incentives to hide the extent of unrest in their areas from higher-ups. Small-time dissidents are easier to monitor

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