Hippeis by Leslie J Worley;

Author:Leslie J Worley;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Unlimited)
Published: 1994-06-15T00:00:00+00:00

6

Greek Cavalry in the Fourth Century B.C.

DOI: 10.4324/9780429032721-6

The fourth century B.C. has justifiably been recognized as a period of great change in infantry warfare. Iphicrates, Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and Philip II all won renown and are known today for innovative infantry tactics. And yet, even more far-reaching and generally less well-recognized changes occurred at this same time in the role of cavalry on the battlefield. First, a sizable and proficient mounted force was not only desirable but also, at times, essential for a successful campaign, particularly in Asia, where the Persian horsemen were numerous. Second, a new coordination between cavalry and infantry began to appear. No longer were the cavalry roles and duties restricted to the beginnings and ends of battles—to scouting, screening, and skirmishing before and to screening, harassing, and pursuing after. Cavalry became an integral part of the battle plan, whose maneuvers were timed to aid the infantry and achieve victory. And finally, the cavalry charge, ending in shock, became important as a means of projecting force in battle.

At the beginning of the century, the Ten Thousand, while attempting to march out of Asia, keenly felt the consequences of having inadequate cavalry when facing the Persians. This group of Greek mercenaries, who actually numbered about 10,500 hoplites and 2,500 peltasts, had been part of Cyrus’ army and were involved in the attempt to put that Persian on the throne.1 Before the Battle of Cunaxa, the Greeks had not been concerned about cavalry support because Cyrus’ army totaled between 40,000 and 80,000 men, including at least 3,000 horsemen.2 However, after the battle, with the death of Cyrus and the dissolution of his army, the Greek infantrymen found themselves alone and without any mounted support, deep inside Persian territory. The Ten Thousand faced the same prospects as the Athenians retiring from Syracuse.

Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian exile commanding the Greeks, recognized this deficiency in horsemen.3 Yet he did not have to face this problem in battle, nor did he make any attempt to rectify it for the Persians initially did not try to interfere with the passage of the Greeks. In part, this policy was the easiest way for the Persian king to get the Greeks away from Babylon and out of the center of his empire. When Clearchus and the other generals were tricked, captured, and later executed, the Greek mercenaries elected new commanders, one of whom was Xenophon. These new generals soon came to realize the need for a cavalry force.

At first, Xenophon downplayed the strength of the Persian mounted threat for his men. He told the Greeks:

But if any of you is down hearted because we are without horsemen while the enemy have plenty close by, let him reflect that your ten thousand horsemen are nothing more than ten thousand men, because nobody ever lost his life in battle from the bite or kick of a horse, but it is men who do whatever is done in battle.4

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