Greece in the European Union by Dimitrakopoulos Dionyssis G.;Passas Argyris G.;Passas Argyris G.;

Author:Dimitrakopoulos, Dionyssis G.;Passas, Argyris G.;Passas, Argyris G.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 182239
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Group

Figure 6.1 Greece’s defence and security profile.

Figure 6.1 also makes reference to institutions that are wider in membership, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the UN. These organisations further enhance Greece’s commitment to peaceful processes for the settlement of disputes. OSCE provides Greece and other Balkan states with a mechanism promoting peace and stability and upholding human rights principles in the troubled and multiethnic Balkans. Greece’s membership of and active participation in the Council of Europe enables it to register its concerns whenever human rights are violated by other Member States. The United Nations, finally, can provide, in an emerging global concert of major centres of power (North America, the EU, Russia, Japan and China) as it did in the Gulf War and Bosnia, the legitimising mechanism for peace-keeping and peacemaking operations.

Keeping in mind Greece’s aforementioned foreign policy profile, the country can be described today as a satisfied, status quo-orientated, strategically located, medium-sized power whose main objective is to engage heavily in institutionalised multilateral arrangements (such as the EU and NATO) that will help to consolidate a structure of co-operation and peace in its troubled neighbourhood.

The momentous changes surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact called for an appropriate re-examination of Europe’s security architecture. Greek policy-makers currently view NATO as a gradually expanding alliance that provides the values of collective defence and (increasingly) collective security to its members. The Soviet threat was quickly replaced by a whole new set of serious risks which include the spread of nuclear and biological weapons as well as missile launchers. The ‘risk list’ also includes international terrorism, drugs cartels and a variety of forms of internal and regional conflicts stemming from a sudden resurgence of nationalism and ethnic/religious fundamentalism.

Greek policy-makers expect the United States to perpetuate its useful strategic presence in Central Europe. However, it is assumed that the American presence in Central Europe will be progressively reduced to symbolic levels. On the contrary, the Greeks foresee that the United States will raise its profile (both inside and outside NATO) in the most strategic central and eastern Mediterranean regions and that the new risks calculus of the post-Cold War NATO will focus on a North–South rather than an East–West axis. In this respect, Greek policies have been adjusting toward preparing the country to capitalise on its strategic assets such as the island of Crete (especially Souda Bay) and other important Aegean and Dodecanese islands.

Given that Turkey remains Greece’s main security concern, Greek policymakers have sought to define and implement a strategy of adequate deterrence founded on elements of ‘hard’ as well as ‘soft’ power. In terms of hard (military) power, Greece has been spending around 6 per cent of its GDP on defence over a number of years and has sought to maintain a sufficiently deterrent capability in land, air and sea vis-à-vis Turkey. As regards soft (economic/diplomatic) power, Greek policy has sought to strengthen multilateral ties

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