War and Peace in International Rivalry by Paul F. Diehl & Gary Goertz

Author:Paul F. Diehl & Gary Goertz
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780472026913
Publisher: The University of Michigan Press

Recurring Conflict

A number of studies have focused on how conflict reoccurs. This is related to rivalries in that they are a form of recurring conflict that may persist over a broad time period. The part of the work on recurring conflict that concerns us is at the dyadic level of analysis (i.e., repeated conflict between the same pairs of states) rather than repeated conflict involvement at the national level (i.e., a single state “addicted to conflict”—for example, Stoll 1984) or the system level (i.e., the tendency for conflicts to cluster in time within a system). Dyadic recurring conflict most closely parallels what we signify as rivalries between the same pair of states, although usually the concern with recurring conflict has been with onetime, short-term recurrence rather than with repeated conflict over a long time period, characteristic of enduring rivalries.

The phenomenon of dyadic recurring conflict is hardly rare. Maoz (1984) reports that 76 percent of disputes are followed by another dispute between the same states. These findings are mirrored in several other studies that find a link between previous conflict and the likelihood of future conflict between the same states (Richardson 1960; Anderson and McKeown 1987). That conflicts reoccur is strongly supported empirically, but there is little understanding about why they reoccur.

A history of previous disputes between the same states is a good predictor of future conflict (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996), but begs the question of why that conflict is likely. The answer requires greater attention to conditions surrounding the conflict or the interactions themselves. It may be that decisive outcomes or imposed settlements in previous disputes may dampen the tendency for conflicts to reoccur, suggesting that stalemated outcomes may have the opposite effect (Maoz 1984). Hensel (1994) had similar findings, but further added that the prospects for future disputes were also influenced by shifts in military capability between the states. For example, he reports that stalemates and compromises were often followed quickly by new disputes initiated by the stronger state, which was declining in relative capabilities. Anderson and McKeown (1987) also speak of the victor in a previous dispute initiating another conflict in order to reestablish victory. Goertz and Diehl (1992b) found that recurring conflict after a territorial change was most likely when that change was formalized by a treaty and was considered very important to the losing side. Territorial changes were more stable when the losing side was relatively weak and the gaining side regarded the territory as important. Generally, United Nations intervention in a crisis has not been found to have a significant impact on whether two disputants will clash again in the near future (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996).

The consequences of recurring conflict appear fairly clear (and this is confirmed with respect to enduring rivalries in chapter 3). Recurring conflict between the same set of states appears to increase the chance of conflict escalation and war. Leng (1983) found that states adopted more coercive bargaining strategies in successive confrontations with same opponent, with war almost always the result after three disputes.

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