The Economist [Thu, 18 Jun 2020] by calibre

Author:calibre [calibre]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: calibre
Published: 2020-06-18T19:47:00.953000+00:00

Lots of factors beyond the government’s control contributed to this. Care homes are a popular way to look after old folk. Britons are fatter than their fellow Europeans. The large ethnic-minority population is disproportionately likely to suffer from diabetes and heart disease, which increase the risk of severe covid-19. Genomic analysis suggests Britain imported lots of cases from Spain, before it was clear how prevalent the virus was there. One in seven Britons live in London, an international travel hub which prior to the pandemic received nearly 1,500 flights a day.

Yet the government’s poor response has contributed. On March 12th, having joked two weeks earlier about shaking hands in a hospital with covid patients, Boris Johnson, the prime minister, turned serious: “families are going to lose loved ones before their time.” But the restrictions he announced were light: those with symptoms were told to stay at home for a week; those older than 70 instructed to avoid cruises. Meanwhile, continental Europe was already beginning to lock down.

Given the government’s well-publicised suspicion of “experts’” views about Brexit, some worried it would ignore the scientists’ advice on dealing with the pandemic. These fears were unfounded. The government’s advisory committee (the Scientific Advisory Group on Emergencies, or SAGE) helped shape policy—which was, in early March, to protect the vulnerable, while tailoring restrictions on others to ensure the health service was not overwhelmed. The virus would spread among the general population, which would build immunity to the disease.

At that stage, there was great uncertainty about numbers. Even so, some of SAGE’s advice seems questionable. On March 3rd the committee minuted that: “There is currently no evidence that cancelling large events would be effective,” on the grounds that those who might have attended would go to the pub instead. But not all would, and if they did, there would have been less risk of the infection spreading across the country, which it did. So large events went ahead, including a football match on March 11th between Liverpool and Atletico Madrid, attended by 3,000 Spanish fans.

Perhaps the government should have questioned the experts more closely. But it “was getting advice it wanted to hear”, notes Sir Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London, who worked on the inquiry into the Iraq war and has reviewed the government’s early response. Boris Johnson was focused on protecting the economy, and his instincts are liberal. “Of course people must make their own decisions,” he told a press conference. “I’m a believer, as I say, in freedom.” He was unlikely to scrutinise advice that went with his grain.

Then it became clear just how fast the disease was spreading. On March 13th, Neil Ferguson of Imperial College London, whose team has produced the outbreak’s most influential modelling, presented analysis to SAGE which showed hospitals would soon be overwhelmed. Policy changed—but not swiftly enough. On March 16th Mr Johnson advised people to avoid all unnecessary contact. On March 18th he announced that schools would close. It was not until March 23rd that he ordered people to stay at home.

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