A Glass Half Full?: Rebalance, Reassurance, and Resolve in the U.S.-China Strategic Relationship by Michael E. O'Hanlon & James Steinberg

Author:Michael E. O'Hanlon & James Steinberg [O'Hanlon, Michael E. & Steinberg, James]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Geopolitics, Political Science, World, Asian, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9780815731306
Google: Lrb_DQAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 35192109
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
Published: 2017-05-30T00:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER 6

Strategic Issues: Space, Cyber, and Nuclear Matters

Moving from regional issues to global or strategic ones, how have the United States and China been doing in domains such as nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine, space, and cyber?

This is a complex set of issues with many different dimensions, only some of those truly overlapping, and thus there is no easy verdict or clear thematic interpretation of how things are going. The relationship has not seen major positive breakthroughs in any of these issue areas, although some progress has been made in dealing with the economic dimension of cyber espionage. Nor has it seen a major effort by the parties to seek out new areas of potential common ground in the way we advocated in 2014. For example, various types of low-risk arms control concepts for the use of space, and certain specific codes of conduct for cyber, have not been seriously explored. The state of U.S.-Russia relations has precluded further cuts in offensive arms by the nuclear superpowers that could have provided an opportunity for China also to show restraint (by making a political commitment not to increase the size of its own force as Moscow and Washington cut theirs, for example). U.S. domestic politics, among other factors, prevented any serious consideration of ratification of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. In addition, there have been significant tensions in certain nuclear-related areas, such as the expected U.S. deployment of a THAAD missile-defense system to South Korea to address the North Korean threat, which China views as a threat to its second-strike nuclear capability, and ongoing disagreements over many cyber matters.

That said, there has also continued to be some degree of restraint by both countries, and the situation seems not to have significantly deteriorated in these domains. The opportunity remains for a future U.S. president and the Chinese government to pursue more substantive areas of cooperation.

On the subject of nuclear weapons, and the related matter of missile defense, there is at least some limited amount of good news. China, for all the growth in its military budget, is not pursuing a superpower-scale nuclear arsenal at this point. It is modernizing its nuclear force with a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the JIN-class SSBN submarine, but not enlarging it substantially. And it has again formally hewed to a nuclear no-first use policy after having created some ambiguity on that matter in 2014.1 Unlike the parties to the U.S.-Soviet competition, China has not sought nuclear parity with either the United States or Russia.

In terms of offensive weaponry, the United States continues to field a very large nuclear force, much larger than China’s. But it has continued to scale back this force and, at least under President Obama, has indicated a willingness to go further in carrying out reductions, should Russia be so inclined. President Obama sought to promote nuclear safety throughout his presidency, even if progress toward his nuclear zero vision as expressed in his 2009 Prague speech was slow. He showed interest in shoring up regimes like the CTBT even if unable to achieve formal ratification in the Senate.

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